Energy diversification has become a priority for Turkey after the
downing of the Russian warplane near Syria, Suat Kınıklıoğlu, executive
director of Ankara’s Center for Strategic Communication, told New Europe
in an interview. Speaking on the sidelines of the Athens Security Forum
2016:Searching for a Modus Vivendi in Relations between the West
andRussia, organized by the Hellenic Foundation for European and
Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and NATO, Kınıklıoğlu discussed the chilling
ties between Moscow and Ankara, their impact on energy, plans for gas
exports from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe, Turkey’s relations
with NATO and the EU, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s risky
politics.
New Europe:
You said during the
conference that Turkey miscalculated the reaction of Russia and
normalisation is difficult. Is this changing the energy outlook for
Turkey?
Suat Kınıklıoğlu: Yes, it certainly does. As you
know, Turkey imports 58% of its gas from Russia and as soon as the
crisis broke out, the first thing Turkey did was talk to the
Azerbaijanis, the Qataris, the Kurds and now with Israel because
normalisation is very much motivated by the gas component because
finally – we should have done this earlier – diversification has become a
very important part of Turkish thinking after this incident with the
Russians.
NE:
Do you think there will be normalisation with Egypt?
SK: I don’t know. It’s tough because the [Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah el-] Sisi’s regime obviously they see the Muslim
Brotherhood as the big threat and my understanding is Ankara wants a
guarantee that they won’t be hanged, that they would be pardoned. I
don’t know whether the Sisi regime is ready for that. But obviously the
Egyptians also have an interest of normalising with Turkey, but I have
little information about the current state of negotiations. But what is
interesting is these conditions seem to be very effective in how the
Israelis treat their bilateral dealings with Turkey.
NE:
Also there is energy cooperation between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. Can there be cooperation in energy with Turkey?
SK: Of course, the Israeli gas, if it is even
shipped through pipeline in Turkey, it has to go through Cypriot
economic zone, I think, so there will have to be discussions with the
Cypriots. Of course, if Cypriot unification will happen, then that would
be done in much more positive climate. We don’t know. I never promise
anything on Cyprus because each time you are optimistic about it
something wrong happens. I hope this will happen because we all want at
least that problem to be resolved. Turkey now has a lot of problems on
its plate so one resolution of the Cyprus issue, followed up by
Turkish-Israeli normalisation in tandem with Egyptian-Turkish
normalisation would, of course, be quite important for Turkey and would
be very positive for the Eastern Mediterranean.
NE:
Is Turkey going back to better relations with NATO?
SK: As soon as Turkey shot down the Russian
airplane, the first think Ankara did is they went to NATO. I think
Erdogan increasingly realises that Turkey’s traditional security
relationships are really the ones that matter. And the [US President
Barack] Obama administration has also been very careful to show
solidarity with Turkey against Russia although the relationship with
Russia was very good but one incident instantly has transformed it. So I
think we will see further cooperation between NATO and Turkey and
hopefully over time a little bit more deepening alliance relationship
with NATO. Nevertheless, the warming up of relations with NATO was not
by choice but necessity.
NE:
How about ties with the EU?
SK: With the EU the focus is on the refugee crisis.
The European are really keen to assure that Turkey stops the flow of
refugees. Of course, there are some chapters open in the negotiations
but whether this will lead to something larger remains to be seen.
NE:
Are energy ties with the EU discussed since Turkey wants to become a transit state?
SK: For instance, if Israeli gas comes to Turkey, it
could easily be forwarded to Europe through the Turkish network. There
is a lot of gas in the Kurdish region. And, of course, don’t forget
Iran. Now with the sanctions lifted, Iranian gas could also come through
Turkey to Europe. Turkey is very keen on this energy hub-transit
country phenomenon and I think they are now opportunities with Israeli
gas, Egyptian gas, Kurdish gas, Iranian gas. Europe also has an interest
in lessening its dependence on Russia.
NE:
Is Turkish Stream dead?
SK: I don’t know. It depends on the Russians. What I
know is with the current political situation, the discussions are
really sort of on hold right now.
NE:
You mentioned at the conference that Turkey is a risky country. You mean geopolitically risky?
SK: Well, internally the situation is getting
really, really bad. I mean Erdogan has polarised the country so much,
freedom of expression, pressure on the media, on intellectuals and
academics. There is quite a bit of tension in the country. The
confrontation with the PKK means that every day some soldier, some
police officer is killed. Of course, there are also civilian casualties
in the fighting, civilians who are caught in between so it puts a lot of
pressure. I am very much concerned as Erdogan continues to polarize the
country and is far from being a unifying or compromising personality.
NE:
But with the Kurdish leadership, the relationship is good…
SK: In Iraq. Not with the Kurdish leadership in Turkey, which is of course an irony in itself.
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