Mr. Borisov’s Tightrope Game

Mr. Borisov’s Tightrope Game
energia.gr
Τρι, 29 Ιουνίου 2010 - 17:16
For those who follow the progress and inclinations of Bulgaria’s centre right populist government ever since it came to power last July, the announcement made on June 11th by prime minister Boyko Borisov, over his intention to pull out of the much touted Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline project did not come as a total surprise.

For those who follow the progress and inclinations of Bulgaria’s centre right populist government ever since it came to power last July, the announcement made on June 11th by prime minister Boyko Borisov, over his intention to pull out of the much touted Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline project did not come as a total surprise. The 256 km pipeline which will be able to transport some 35.0 -50.0 million tones per year, was originally conceived in the early 1990’s as an easy and economical way to by pass the congested Bosporus straits. With oil shipping cargoes set to rise steeply over the coming years, especially after Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil production comes on stream in 2014 the need for a pipeline bypass acquires a new urgency.

Mr Borisov has never really hidden his distaste for Russia and his preference for anything American, whether in culture or politics. In that sense it is rather surprising why it took so long for the actual rift to happen. Because the abandonment by Bulgaria of the above Russian backed oil pipeline project, where Russia controls 51% of the operating consortium, and the parallel abrupt termination of negotiations over Russian participation in the Belene nuclear plant can only mean a complete turnaround on economic and political relations with Moscow, short of total collapse.

According to most analysts next in line to suffer will be the South Stream gas pipeline project where Bulgaria is to play a key role since the huge 63 BCM capacity pipeline, which will cross underwater the Black Sea, will surface in Bulgaria where it is planned to branch off in a north and south west direction. Mr.Borisov of late looses no opportunity in promoting the Nabucco gas pipeline which he very misleadingly calls ‘American’, although it is clearly a European project. However, Nabucco’s future is far from certain as there is no guarantee as yet for its huge gas supply requirements. On the other hand Bulgaria’s geographical position ensured optimal economic design and maximum route utilization for the South Stream pipeline, since by going through its territory the pipeline could at the same time serve several countries and thousands of companies. Rerouting the pipeline through Romania , as Gazprom has stated that it is already considering, not only means a significant time delay but possibly reducing it in size. That would be a significant blow to the project’s long term viability argue industrial sources.

Mr.Borisov’s decision to alienate his country from some of the key energy routes of the region no doubt signifies a major political re alignment as energy has come to dominate the political agenda of the Black Sea over recent years. However, the reasons cited by Mr. Borisov, and which are supposedly centered on the huge environmental dangers and the lack of financial resources which need to be contributed by Bulgaria, are far from convincing. To start with the finances for the construction of the pipeline are guaranteed by the majority shareholder, which includes Russian state controlled oil companies. Then the environmental concerns are grossly overstated since the Burgas region, where the pipeline will go through in its initial stages is an industrial area anyway and its overland route through Bulgarian territory is not interfering with any wild or rare fauna or flora, especially since at the end of the day the pipeline will be buried five metres underground without leaving any visible tracks. Nor is any deep water drilling involved in any part of the project as Mr.Borisov erroneously and purposely implied.

The real reasons behind Sofia’s change of mind as far as regional energy policy is concerned are to be found in Mr.Borisov’s newly formulated Atlantic policy whereby Bulgaria seeks much closer ties with Washington rather than Brussels or god forbid Moscow, not only on energy but over a wide range of subjects including technology, welfare, investments, foreign policy and defense. A clear demonstration of this fast developing Bulgarian-USA special relationship was given on May 27 during the official visit to Sofia of CIA’s head Mr.Leo Paneta when Mr.Borisov in press statements prided himself over the deep routed ties and excellent cooperation between the security services of the two countries.

Although we shall never know if it was American pressure or a Bulgarian preemptive action -in order to reconfirm their Atlantic credentials- that forced Mr.Borisov to take a unilateral decision to pull out of a parliament approved and official intergovernmental agreement (the Burgas-Alexandroupolis tripartite agreement between Russia, Greece and Bulgaria was signed in Athens in March 2007), the fact remains that Sofia is now distancing itself from both Greece and Russia. For Greece the damage from the non realization of the project is significant in geopolitical terms as it has sought over recent years to strengthen its position as a potential energy hub. For Russia the damage is far bigger and more substantial in both geopolitical and financial terms as its alternative, to route the new Caspian oil through Turkey, means building a more expensive pipeline (i.e. Samsun-Ceychan) and forging even closer ties with Turkey, something which has so far cleverly sought to avoid.

Given Russia’s energy supremacy and its capability for retribution (read Ukrainian gas crises in 2006/2007 and 2009) it is not an exaggeration to state that Mr.Borisov is playing with fire by openly defying Moscow. Pipelines and LNG plants, permanent or floating, cannot be constructed in few months and it remains to be seen where Bulgaria will get its gas from once Moscow closes the taps. Greece, which is well supplied with natural gas thanks to its LNG terminal in Revithousa and its interconnector with Turkey, may not be as willing this time to oblige by reversing the flow of its main pipeline (the one which brings Russian gas to Greece via Bulgaria). Nor will it be that motivated to speed up plans for the construction of the Komotini-Stara Zagora interconnector. Such projects imply a steady and mutually advantageous cooperation, a position which of late Bulgaria does not appear to share .

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