In the previous two Risk Watch articles in the Financial
Mirror (‘A
Gamble that Cost Lives’ and ‘Mari-Vassilikos
Disaster: More Troubling Questions’), I outlined a number of key principles
applicable to major hazard sites as well as the requirements of the EU Major
Hazards Directive (the ‘Seveso II Directive’) and asked whether the official
inquiries into the disaster are up to the task. In this article, I probe
further and consider specifically the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC),
the operators of the Vassiliko power station site.
Confusion and Clarification
At present, for any kind of understanding of the disaster the public has to
rely on statements from a range of politicians and officials as quoted and
paraphrased by journalists and editors. We wait, perhaps naively, for the two
official inquiries to report so as to get a more accurate and complete picture
but, according to a straw poll I conducted in various kafenios and tavernas, a
‘whitewash’ is widely predicted, accompanied by ‘etzi ine stin Kypro’ and a
shrug of the shoulders.
There are some grounds for such cynicism when one hears via the media where the
focus of the various investigations seems to be, not to mention the credentials
of the Polyviou inquiry in particular. For example, the Cyprus Mail reports
that the government’s joint Health and Environment Committees have discussed at
length the European Commission Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC in terms of whether
or not it ‘should have been implemented on the day of the blast’. The article
then tells us that the Directive ‘aims to improve coordination between
different authorities, reduce bureaucracy and improve information provided to
the public and relevant authorities’. This is not the Directive’s main aim.
Unfortunately, this focus on ‘who did what on the day’ and ‘who failed to
coordinate with whom’ gives only a partial and very misleading impression, as
it omits the main thrust of the Major Hazards Directive which is firstly topreventmajor
accidents occurring and secondly limit their impact. As outlined in the
previous Risk Watch, the Directive, Article 7, requires designated site
operators to have a Major Accident Prevention Policy ‘designed to guarantee a
high level of protection for man and the environment’, an associated Safety
Management System, a detailed Safety Report (Article 9) on the effectiveness of
the MAPP and SMS, systematic major hazards risk assessment and so on.
All the reported focus of the joint Committees has been on whether the Fire
Services responded correctly. Already, Fire Services personnel have been
suspended, implying they are culpable. The article also reports that a Fire
Services official told the joint Committees that the Fire Services did not need
to implement the Directive because the risk of chemical leakage was limited and
could be handled within hours. Whether true or false, this dubious assertion
has no bearing on the EAC’s own obligation as the Vassiliko site operator to
implement the Directive. It is a red herring, as the EAC had the primary duty
to comply in relation to its own site.
So, focusing on implementation of the Directive just on the day of the blast
fails to address all the prior compliance by EAC that was required to ensure
(the Directive demands a ‘guarantee’) that this disaster would never occur. Whatever
the responsibility of the Defence Ministry in respect of the munitions
explosion at adjacent Mari, EAC still had a separate compliance obligation for
its own site. We are told that the Vassiliko site still holds some 135,000
tonnes of diesel and fuel oil. These are far in excess of the threshold
inventories for such substances in Annex 1 of the Directive and therefore
strongly suggest that when the plant was being designed and built in stages
over the period 2001-2009 the Directive should have been complied with in full
by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus, including the land planning and site
location requirements, proximity to habitation and to other sites (especially
other major hazards etc) needed to prevent a domino effect (Article 8). Let’s
remember that it was mostly by luck that the EAC fuel storage tanks did not
blow up when the blast from Mari hit the site.
Produce the Evidence
Rather like ‘the dog that didn’t bark’ in Sherlock Holmes, the silence from EAC
on their compliance with the Directive has been deafening. One would have
expected them to be telling all and sundry about how good their MAPP was, and
how well their SMS and emergency plans (offsite and onsite) had functioned. Could
the silence be explained if EAC in fact had none of these vital elements?
Vital questions for EAC to answer therefore include:
• Who at the EAC approved the siting and go-ahead for the Vassiliko plant?
• Was the Seveso Directive fully complied with by EAC, and if not why not?
• Who at EAC was responsible for compliance during the various stages of its
life cycle, (design, construction, handover, operation,
modifications/extensions etc)?
• What steps did EAC take to address the major hazards interactions and
potential domino effect vis-à-vis the Mari Naval Base?
• When did EAC suitably inform the public, and especially residents and
businesses in surrounding villages, of its protective provisions at Vassiliko?
• Has the EAC provided to the police and the Polyviou official inquiries copies
of the site MAPP, Safety Management System, detailed Safety Report, major
hazards risk evaluation, and its internal and external emergency plans, and if
not why not?
• If Vassiliko is to be rebuilt on the same site, how will EAC ensure
compliance with the Seveso Directive?
In addition to Vassiliko, EAC operates a number of other power stations and the
stored fuel inventories at each are likely to bring them within the scope of
the Seveso Directive. Can the EAC produce conclusive evidence to assure the
public that it has fully complied with the Directive at each of these sites?
Moreover, on top of human and environmental safety as demanded by the EU
Directive, as a strategic utility provider EAC has a further (governance)
obligation to protect its operations, its shareholders, its customers and the
economy from unnecessary loss and damage. Therefore, to meet ISO 31000
requirements and the forthcoming EU Directive on Corporate Governance, EAC
should have had a comprehensive and robust risk management system for all its
sites, addressing prevention as well as emergencies and crises and covering all
manner of threats and major accident scenarios.
Conclusion
During my career, I have participated in various investigations and studies for
and/or in response to official inquiries into man-made disasters, including the
Morton Inquiry into the Safety of Natural Gas, the Fennell Inquiry into the
Kings Cross London Underground Fire, the Sea Empress Oil Tanker Disaster Inquiry
and the Piper Alpha Disaster Inquiry. All of these inquiries shared some golden
attributes, such as independence from political or other interference; a
strong, impartial and experienced chairman; relevant multi-disciplinary
technical expertise on the inquiry committee and support team; and a
determination to get to the whole truth. This enabled those inquiries to
deliver comprehensive reports and recommendations that avoided the ‘shooting at
the mice and missing the elephants’ problem from which unfortunately the
Mari-Vassiliko inquiries appear to suffer. Red herrings and scapegoats will do
a great injustice, not only to the victims and their families but also to the
Cypriot people as a whole. The Polyviou inquiry, for example, should have been
held in public to ensure transparency.
I wait to see whether any of the questions I have raised will be asked by the
inquiry, what answers and supporting evidence were received and what the
inquiry’s analysis, conclusions and recommendations are. Ever the optimist, I
await a positive outcome.
Dr Alan Waring is an international risk management consultant with extensive
experience in Europe, Asia and the Middle East with industrial, commercial and
governmental clients. Contact[email protected].