BP has begun work that will eventually lead to the removal of the blowout preventer from the sea bed of the Gulf of Mexico . The huge device, which failed to prevent the biggest oil spill in U.S. history, will then pass into the custody of the Department of Justice for close forensic examination as a potential crime scene.

The inspection of this device, perhaps more than any other single part of the investigation into why the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded on April 20 killing eleven men, could determine whether BP remains the designated villain or rig owner Transocean bears a portion of the blame for the disaster.

A lot is riding on the outcome of criminal inquiries and numerous other investigations--from BP, the Presidential Commission, Congress, the Federal Chemical Safety Board and the Marine Board. The liability for billions of dollars in fines and cleanup costs, the reputations of huge corporations and their ability to continue operating in the U.S. depend on how blame is apportioned.

BP seems likely to be the first to give its version of events. It plans to publish preliminary results of its internal investigation into the accident around the end of this month and has already hinted at its findings.

The company said last month that it does not believe there is evidence it acted negligently in the run up to the accident. Chief Executive Tony Hayward forcefully rebutted allegations that the design used for the Macondo well was inherently unsafe.

Instead, BP appears to be pushing blame towards its contractors, Transocean and Halliburton. In May, it identified seven mechanisms that may have contributed to the disaster, most of which were the direct responsibility of Transocean or Halliburton.

BP's most senior manager on the Deepwater Horizon, Donald Vidrine, told the internal inquiry that Transocean employees "assured him everything was normal during tests conducted shortly before the blast." Vidrine has refused to appear before other inquiries, citing health reasons.

Several Transocean employees who were on board the rig have also refused to testify before the Marine Board investigation, but the company has engaged in a tit for tat media battle with BP.

Last week it accused BP of refusing to hand over logs, operational reports and seismic data that could shed light on the blast. BP dismissed Transocean's allegations as a stunt.

The companies are also in dispute over whether Transocean will be liable to pay a share of the massive costs BP has incurred so far from the spill--$6 billion on cleanup and containment so far and another $20 billion to be paid into a compensation fund. Transocean claims the wording of its contract with BP exempts it from any liability for these costs, even if it were proven to have been negligent. BP rejected that notion.

Two other companies also have a major stake in the outcome of these investigations. BP's partners in the Macondo well--Anadarko Petroleumand Mitsui--have so far refused to pay any costs for the spill, claiming that BP's gross negligence means it is 100% liable.

If investigations exonerate BP, those companies will be liable for billions of dollars. There are particular doubts over whether Anadarko could afford to pay its full share. The company's credit rating was cut to junk level in June.

Most investigations should reach some sort of conclusion before the end of the year. However, given the multiplicity of parallel investigations, the complexity of the accident itself and the refusal of key witnesses to testify, there remains a strong possibility that they will fail to single out one culpable individual or company.

So the families of the men who died that night and the people whose livelihoods were damaged by the oil slick will never have the satisfaction of knowing who precisely is to blame for their misfortune.

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