There is one word that explains the apparent (and surprising to most) flexibility of the EU and the Eurozone towards Greece, just one week after anti-austerity SYRIZA won the parliamentary elections in Greece: Oligarchs.

There is one word that explains the apparent (and surprising to most) flexibility of the EU and the Eurozone towards Greece, just one week after anti-austerity SYRIZA won the parliamentary elections in Greece: Oligarchs.

Describing the nexus between economic, political and Media power in Greece (Diaploki in Greek) as it developed during the last four decades, it is increasingly viewed by some as the main stumbling block that prevented structural reforms in Greece while deflecting the onus of austerity to be shouldered mostly by the politically weakest part of Greece society, mostly the Middle class and the private sector.

The fact that some of Greece's creditors, mainly Germany, use this in order to explain away the fact that the austerity programme imposed on Greece proved disastrous and to deflect criticism does not mean that it is not true.

During 2014, as reality started penetrating even Berlin's ideological shutters, this term was used increasingly in discussions with Athens. Attention started to shift towards the nexus that was recognised as a major obstacle to a much needed success.

This recognition partly explains the events that led to the election of SYRIZA in January's parliamentary elections in Greece, specifically why the Samaras government, until recently believed to be the darling of the creditors and especially of Germany, was abandoned to its (ill) fate.

Former Prime minister Antonis Samaras was surprised, even shocked, when the Troika refused to hand him the least concession that he could use to avert catastrophe for his government as he was heading to presidential elections in the Greek Parliament. Not only was he denied anything that would allow him to convince Deputies of his success in steering Greece out of suffocating bailout memoranda, the Troika upped the ante putting him in a much tougher position.

Predictably, he lost the Presidential election in December and, equally predictably, he lost the parliamentary election that followed in January. And, although it is too soon to judge, even after the elections brought SYRIZA to power, there was no immediate disaster materialising. On the contrary, the new government's positions seem to be at least listened to with only the German government remaining entirely aloof.

This may just be a question of tactics, with Brussels and Member State governments setting the stage for a confrontation when the time arrives, when the Greek government fully shows it's colours and when financial realities make Athens more amenable to pressure.

But it can also mean that Greece's creditors are confronting realities themselves, trying to find a way to correct a seriously flawed programme while breaking through the Oligarch barrier in Greece. Experience showed that this would be impossible with the “old guard” Greek political parties, themselves part of the Oligarch nexus. It would be more than possible with SYRIZA in power, a party with a vested interest in doing just that.

As a Brussels insider told New Europe, with a big smile on his face, “we will witness politicians going to jail”. This will make many people in Greece very happy and also buy the new government time to face the financial situation. It will also bring smiles in Brussels and in Member State capitals, even if some of them are directly or indirectly implicated in the creation of the Greek Oligarch nexus in the first place.

Beyond necessary posturing on all sides, with the new Greek government only a few days old, even before the new parliament has been convened to give a vote a confidence, Athens is sending the message that compromise is not an unknown word for them. Europe in general is reciprocating. And everyone is looking, once again, to Berlin.

http://www.neurope.eu/article/eu-and-greece-unite-over-greek-oligarchs