One of the
great mysteries of today’s global markets is their irrepressible enthusiasm,
even as the world around them appears on the verge of chaos or collapse. And
yet, investors may be more rational than they appear when it comes to pricing
in political risks. If investing is foremost about discounting future cash
flows, it’s important to focus precisely on what will and will not affect those
calculations. The potential crises that may be most dramatic or violent are,
ironically, the ones that the market has the easiest time looking through.
Far more
dangerous are gradual shifts in international global institutions that upend
expectations about how key players will behave. Such shifts may emerge only
slowly, but they can fundamentally change the calculus for pricing in risks and
potential returns.
Today’s
market is easy to explain in terms of fundamental factors: earnings are
growing, inflation has been kept at bay, and the global economy appears to be
experiencing a broad, synchronized expansion. In October, the International
Monetary Fund updated its global outlook to predict that only a handful of
small countries will suffer a recession next year. And while the major central
banks are planning, or have already begun, to tighten monetary policy, interest
rates will remain low for now.
Political
crises, however sensational they may be, are not likely to change investors’
economic calculus. Even after the greatest calamities of the twentieth century,
markets bounced back fairly quickly. After Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, US
stock markets fell by 10%, but recovered within six weeks. Similarly, after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, US stocks dropped nearly 12%, but
bounced back in a month. After the assassination of President
John F.
Kennedy, stock prices fell less than 3%, and recovered the next day.
Yes, each
political crisis is different. But through most of them, veteran
emerging-markets investor
Jens Nystedt notes, market participants can
count on a response from policymakers. Central banks and finance ministries
will almost always rush to offset rising risk premia by adjusting interest
rates or fiscal policies, and investors bid assets back to their pre-crisis
values.
Today, a
conflict with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs tops most lists
of potential crises. Open warfare or a nuclear incident on the Korean Peninsula
would trigger a humanitarian disaster, interrupt trade with South Korea – the
world’s 13th largest economy – and send political shockwaves around the world.
And yet such a disaster would most likely be brief, and its outcome would be
clear almost immediately. The world’s major powers would remain more or less
aligned, and future cash flows on most investments would continue undisturbed.
The same
can be said of Saudi Arabia, where
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman just
purged the government and security apparatus to consolidate his power. Even if
a sudden upheaval in the Kingdom were to transform the balance of power in the
Middle East, the country would still want to maintain its exports. And if there
were an interruption in global oil flows, it would be cushioned by competing
producers and new technologies.
Similarly,
a full-scale political or economic collapse in Venezuela would have serious regional
implications, and might result in an even deeper humanitarian crisis there. But
it would most likely not have any broader, much less systemic, impact on energy
and financial markets.
Such
scenarios are often in the headlines, so their occurrence is less likely to
come as a surprise. But even when a crisis, like a cyber attack or an epidemic,
erupts unexpectedly, the ensuing market disruption usually lasts only as long
as it takes for investors to reassess discount rates and future profit streams.
By contrast,
changes in broadly shared economic assumptions are far more likely to trigger a
sell-off, by prompting investors to reassess the likelihood of actually
realizing projected cash flows. There might be a dawning awareness among
investors that growth rates are slowing, or that central banks have missed the
emergence of inflation once again. Or the change might come more suddenly,
with, say, the discovery of large pockets of toxic loans that are unlikely to
be repaid.
As
emerging-market investors well know, political changes can affect economic
assumptions. But, again, the risk stems less from unpredictable shocks than
from the slow erosion of institutions that investors trust to make an uncertain
world more predictable. For example, investors in Turkey know that the
country’s turn away from democracy has distanced it from Europe and introduced
new risks for future returns. On the other hand, in Brazil, despite an ongoing
corruption scandal that has toppled one president and could topple another,
investors recognize that the country’s institutions are working – albeit in
their own cumbersome way – and they have priced risks accordingly.
The
greatest political risk to global markets today, then, is that the key players
shaping investor expectations undergo a fundamental realignment. Most
concerning of all is the United States, which is now seeking to carve out a new
global role for itself under President Donald Trump. By withdrawing from
international agreements and trying to renegotiate existing trade deals, the US
has already become less predictable. Looking ahead, if Trump and future US
leaders continue to engage with other countries through zero-sum transactions
rather than cooperative institution-building, the world will be unable to
muster a joint response to the next period of global market turmoil.
Ultimately,
a less reliable US will require a higher discount rate almost everywhere.
Unless other economic cycles intervene before investors’ expectations shift,
that will be the end of the current market boom.
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/real-risk-global-economy/